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NOTES
Conflict of Laws
JURISDICTION

By

OVER NONRESIDENT AIRCRAFT OPERATORS
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF PROCESS

Just as the advent of the automobile, bringing with it extensive use of

state highways by nonresident motorists, raised a number of jurisdictional questions in the early part of the century, so the increased use
of the airplane has posed similar problems in recent years. In general,
the states have endeavored to meet these difficulties by employing means
similar to those used to solve the problem of the nonresident motorist.
The basic question involved herein is whether or not a strict analogy
can be drawn between nonresident motorists and nonresident aircraft
operators, or whether the states must find some other basis for acquiring
jurisdiction. In this connection, it will be necessary to determine, in the
light of existing authority, the validity of the statutes which have already
been enacted in this area, as well as to attempt to predict the future
import of similar state legislation dealing with the problem of the nonresident aircraft operator.
Existing Legislation
In recognition of the widespread use of aircraft during the last two
decades, both by private individuals and commercial interests, at least
eight states have passed legislation providing for some method of acquiring jurisdiction over nonresident owners or operators of aircraft.,
All except one of these states, 2 have followed the pattern of the early
Pennsylvania statute on the subject.3 With some variation in phraseo1 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4831 (1949); MD.ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 75, § 159
(1951); MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 90, § 50 (1954); MINN. STAT. § 360.0215 (1949);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 6:5-3 (Supp. 1953); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 250; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit.
2, § 1410 (Supp. 1953); VA. CODE § 8-67.4 (Supp. 1952). A number of additional states have adopted the provision of the Uniform Aeronautics Act which
stipulates that liability to passengers arising out of collisions on land and in the air
will be determined by the tort law of that state, no mention being made of service
of process upon nonresidents. UmioRm AERONAUTICS AcT § 6 (withdrawn by National Conference of Commissioners, 1943).
2 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 250.
3 ". . . any nonresident of this Commonwealth, being the operator or owner of
any aircraft, who shall accept the privilege, extended by the laws of this Commonwealth to nonresident operators and owners, of operating an aircraft . . .shall, by
the operation of an aircraft over or above the lands and waters of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, make and constitute the Secretary of Revenue of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania his, her, or their agent for the service of process in any
civil suit or proceeding instituted in the courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania against such operator or owner of such aircraft arising out of, or by reason of,
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logy, the statutes in these seven states provide that the accident must be
one arising from operations within the territorial limits of the state, e.g.,
"occurring within or above the state" 4 ; "growing out of such use or
operation of an aircraft in the State" 5; "occurring in Maryland" 6;
"occurring [sic] on or over the land or water or in the air space of this
7
State."
While the obvious intent of the above legislation is to protect persons
and property within the confines of the state, the New York statute on
the subject presents difficulties in that it cannot be fully justified on
to service upon nonresident aircraft operathese grounds. In reference
8
tors, the statute provides:
The operation by a nonresident of an aircraft from any airfield in this
state, or such operation of an aircraft owned by a nonresident if so
operated with his consent, express or implied, shall be deemed equivalent
to an appointment by such nonresident of the secretary of state to be his
true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served the summons in any
action against him, growing out of any accident or collision in which such
nonresident may be involved while operating an aircraft which has landed
at, or departed from any airfield in this state or in which such aircraft may
be involved while being operated in this state with the consent, express or
implied, of such nonresident owner.... [Emphasis added]

It is evident that this statute, unlike those discussed above, cannot be
construed as applying only to causes of action arising within the limits of
the state. This extra-territorial aspect of the statute was employed by
9
the plaintiff in the recent case Peters v. Robin Airlines, one of the few
cases thus far litigated in this area of the law. The administratrix of the
decendent, a New York resident, killed in an airplane crash in California,
brought a wrongful death action against the defendant nonresident corporation, by service of summons on the secretary of state. The court
upheld the validity of the service, ruling that the departure from an airfield within the state fulfilled the demands of the statute. The fact that
the plane had made five intermediate landings in other states was considered "irrelevant." Dismissing the contention that there was a violation
of due process, it was held that the airline by doing business had established sufficient minimum contacts within the state, thus enabling its
courts to acquire jurisdiction.
any accident or collision, occurring within or above the Commonwealth, in which
such aircraft is involved. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1410 (Supp. 1953).
4 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 4831 (1949).
5 MmN. STAT. § 360.0215 (1949).
6 MD. Am. CODE GEN. LAws art. 75, § 159 (1951).
7 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 6:5-3 (Supp. 1953).
8 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 250, as amended, Laws 1953, c. 148; adding the clause
"or in which such aircraft may be involved while being operated in this state." This
was added pursuant to the governor's recommendation when he approved the
original statute, Laws 1952, c. 748, that it was necessary to effectuate the intent of
the statute.
9 203 Misc. 924, 118 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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This decision was reversed on appeal; 10 the court ruled that the
statute was unconstitutional as an attempt to extend the state's police
powers beyond its territorial limits. In effect, the court ignored the
"doing business" theory, so heavily relied upon by the lower court. Thus,
these conflicting decisions point up the two possible theories upon which
the statutes can be constitutionally justified.
The "Police Power" Theory
The Supreme Court was first called upon to determine the constitutionality of a nonresident motorist statute in 1915 when a Maryland
statute requiring a nonresident to procure a license before operating a
motor vehicle within the state was challenged. The Court upheld the
statute in Hendrick v. Maryland," ruling that it was a reasonable police
power measure and not a direct burden on interstate commerce. A year
later in Kane v. New Jersey,12 the Court upheld a New Jersey statute
which provided that a nonresident automobile operator appoint the
Secretary of State as his agent upon whom process might be served in
any action brought to recover damages for the negligent operation of the
automobile within the state.
Such was the situation when Massachusetts passed a statute which
stipulated that the mere operation by a nonresident of a motor vehicle
on the public highways of Massachusetts should be deemed equivalent
to the appointment of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to be his attorney
upon whom process might be served should he become involved in an
accident while using the state's highways.' 3 In Hess v. Pawloshi14 the
Supreme Court upheld the Massachusetts statute on the basis of the
Hendrick and Kane cases as well as on several cases which recognized
the power of a state to acquire jurisdiction over foreign corporations
doing business within the state.' 5 The difference between the formal
appointment of the public official in the Kane case, and the implied
appointment in the case then in issue was considered as "not substantial,
so far as concerns the application of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 16 A subsequent case,'17 held that in order to
satisfy the demands of due process, there need only be some provision for
notice reasonably calculated to reach the defendant. At present, all fortyPeters v. Robin Airlines, 281 App. Div. 903, 120 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d Dep't 1953).
11 235 U.S. 610 (1915).
10

12

242 U.S. 160 (1916).

13

MASS. GEN. LAws c.

14
HAmV.
15
(1917)
16
'7

90, as amended by Laws 1923, c. 431, § 2.
274 U.S. 352 (1927). See Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists, 39
L. REv. 563 (1926).
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U.S. 93
; Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 (U.S. 1856).
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 357 (1927).
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
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eight states, and the District of Columbia have acts providing for substituted service of process on nonresident motorists.' 8
Since the motor vehicle statutes, from their inception, were said to be
founded upon a reasonable-exertise of the state's police power, 19 it is
only natural that the states should attempt to justify the aircraft statutes
on similar grounds. The rationale of the vehicle statutes is that in return
for the privilege of using its highways, the state had the right to demand
that a nonresident be amenable to the courts of 20that state, and as was
reasoned in the famous case of Hess v. Pawloski:
Motor vehicles are dangerous machines; and, even when skillfully and
carefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and
property. In the public interest the state may make and enforce regulations
reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and nonresidents alike, who use its highways.

That the exercise of these powers is not limited to motor vehicles was well
illustrated in Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,2' where the Court applied the
same reasoning to the sale of securities within a state by a nonresident
thus upholding a statute providing for service of process on any agent
transacting business within the county for a nonresident principal. "Both
the sale of securities and the operation of motor vehicles are fraught with
danger and economic harm to the general public," 22 and because of this
are subject to regulation by the states in an attempt to aid and protect
23
the injured.
It would seem that the foreseeability of injury to persons and property
because of the nature of the airplane as a dangerous instrumentality
would place it in the same class as the motor vehicle, thereby subjecting
its operation to the state's police power. Analogizing the regulation of the
state's highways to the supervision of its airways, the same reasoning
which served as a basis for the motor vehicle statutes could, in general,
be applied to the aircraft legislation. It should be noted, however, that
because the highways of a state do not extend beyond its borders, neither
does its jurisdiction. In addition, it is a well-established principle that the4
2
police power of a state may not be projected beyond its borders.
Thus, the New York type statute, which does not restrict service of pro18 These statutes are collected in Knopp v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832, 836-37
(N.D. Iowa 1947).
19

Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).

20

Id. at 356.

21

294 U.S. 623 (1935).
GOODaCH, CoN'LrcT or LAws 203 (3d ed. 1949).
23 That the plaintiff need not be a resident of the state is brought out by a number of decisions which hold that a nonresident plaintiff can sue under the nonresident
motorist statutes. State ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 112 Mont. 253, 114 P.2d
1047 (1941); Alberts v. Alberts, 217 N.C. 443, 8 S.E.2d 523 (1940); Malak v.
Upton, 166 Misc. 817, 3 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Sup. Ct. 1938). See Note, 138 A.L.R. 1464
(1942).
24 GooDR Hc,op. cit. supra note 22, § 12.
22
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cess to acts occurring within the state,25 would find no justification under
this theory. As previously noted, it was on these grounds that the
Appellate Division struck down the New York statute in Peters v. Robin
Airlines. It remains to be considered now whether or not a statute of the
type enacted in New York could be upheld, on the theory of a foreign
corporation "doing business" within the state.
The "Doing Business" Theory
At the outset, it must be realized that a cause of action arising from an
accident involving non-commercial aircraft could not be said to arise
from the doing of business within the state, and those portions of the
statutes dealing with substituted service in such actions could only be
justified on the "police power" theory as outlined above. Due to the
relatively small proportion of suits involving private flights, consideration
will be limited to the problem of the activities of commercial aircraft.
Like other large corporations, an airline, by establishing ticket offices
and by using other airport facilities, extends its business activities into
many jurisdictions. It is upon this "doing business" aspect that those
jurisdictions that enact the New York type statute must attempt to
justify their substituted service. In general, corporations doing business
in a foreign state have been held amenable to the jurisdiction of that
state under various theories, among which are "implied consent," 2 6
"presence," 27 and "submission to jurisdiction, '2 the first of these being
the most widely accepted although admittedly
based upon a fictitious
29
rather than upon actual assent to jurisdiction.
Although a state can not wholly exclude a corporation doing interstate business, 30 it can as a prerequisite to admission, impose certain
statutory conditions to which the corporation must conform. 31 The
statutes imposing such conditions fall into three main classifications.
The first of these requires some form of consent by the corporation, and
the designation of a corporate agent to receive service; the second type
provides for service upon any agent of the corporation, or upon a state
officer, even though not specifically authorized; and finally some of these
statutes provide for service in the same manner as upon a domestic
corporation. 32 Since the aircraft statutes fall within the second classification, our discussion will be confined mostly to this category.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §250.
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404,407 (U.S. 1856).
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
28 Referred to but not expressly relied upon in People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918).
25
26
27

29

1 BEALE, CoN-Lic" or LAWs 385- (1935).

St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882).
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
32 Cahill, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporationsand Individuals Who Carry
On Business Within The Territory, 30 HARV. L. REV. 676, 690 (1917).
30
31
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The courts have traditionally held that where a foreign corporation
has complied with statutory requirements and expressly designated an
agent or state official upon whom process might be served, such service
was valid even for causes of action arising without the state.33 On the
other hand, where the foreign corporation did not appoint such agent, the
courts have denied jurisdiction by substituted service for out-of-state
causes of action 3 4 Thus, where a foreign airline company has authorized
an agent to receive service of process, it will be amenable for causes of
action occurring outside the state.
In cases similar to Peters v. Robin Airlines, where the company has
failed to designate such an agent, service under the New York type
statute should, by the weight of authority, be limited to causes of action
arising within the state. The majority view is expressed in Old Wayne
Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough,35 where the Supreme Court held
invalid a judgment rendered in Pennsylvania, on an insurance policy
issued in Indiana by an Indiana corporation reasoning that even though
the insurance company was engaged in some business in Pennsylvania at
the time, service upon the Pennsylvania insurance commissioner was not
sufficient to acquire jurisdiction for out-of-state transactions. This view
was reiterated in Simon v. Southern Ry.,3 6 where after admitting that
every state has the power to provide for service of process upon foreign
corporations doing business within its limits and to stipulate that in case
the companies fail to appoint such agent service
may be made on an
37
officer designated by law, the Court added:
But this power to designate by statute the officer upon whom service
in suits against foreign corporations may be made relates to business and
transactions within the jurisdiction of the State enacting the law. Otherwise,
claims on contracts wherever made and suits for torts wherever committed
might by virtue of such compulsory statute be drawn to the jurisdiction of
any State in which the foreign corporation might at any time be carrying
on business.

With but
few exceptions,3 8 this is the view followed in a majority of the
39
states.

33 Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917)
(state official); Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148

(S.D.N.Y. 1915) (corporate agent). For collected cases, see Note, 145 A.L.R. 630
(1943).
34 Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907); Simon v.
Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915).
35 204 U.S. 8 (1907).
36 236 U.S.115 (1915).
37 Id. at 130.
38 Owen v. Appalachian Power Co., 78 W.Va. 596, 89 S.E. 262 (1916), holding
valid substituted service on the statutory agent of a Virginia corporation by a resident of Virginia for a cause of action arising in Virginia, merely because the corporation was engaged in some activity in West Virginia.
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In recent years, some doubt has been cast upon this majority view,
although it has not been expressly overruled. In InternationalShoe Co.
v. Washington,40 a corporation having its principal place of business in
Missouri, but employing in Washington a small number of salesmen who
were regularly engaged in soliciting orders and displaying samples, was
held to be "present" and "doing business" in Washington, and amenable
to service of process in the latter state. The court intimated that if a
foreign corporation was sufficiently carrying on business within the
state, it was subject to process for out-of-state causes of action. The
reasoning in this case apparently influenced the court in Perkins v.
Benguet ConsolidatedMining Co., 41 wherein service upon the president
of a foreign corporation doing business in Ohio was upheld, even though
the cause of action arose without the state. In this case, however, the
fact that service was made upon the president of the corporation rather
than upon a state official would seem to distinguish it from the aforementioned cases.
Another aspect of the "doing business" theory was pointed out in the
latter two cases: namely, the degree of activity necessary to constitute
corporate presence for jurisdictional purposes. The courts have failed to
state definitively the essentials of "doing business ' other than that it
must be continuous and systematic,42 it being apparent that each case
turns upon the court's interpretation of the facts. The Restatement of
Conflict of Laws seems to beg the question by taking the view that if the
cause of action arises out of business done within the state, its activities
are sufficient for the state to acquire jurisdiction.4 3 In an oft-cited New
York case,44 Judge Cardozo, in commenting upon the fact that there is
no precise test as to the extent of business that need be transacted said, 45
"All that is requisite is that enough be done to enable us to say that the
corporation is here." At first glance it might appear that the International Shoe case further liberalized this notion of what constitutes "doing
business," when the Court stated :46
... due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the

forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."
39 Central Motor Lines v. Brooks Transportation Co., 225 N.C. 733, 36 S.E.2d
271 (1945); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Newport Culvert Co., 277 Ky. 320, 126
S.W.2d 468 (1939). See recent cases, Note, 162 A.L.R. 1424 (1946).
40
41

326 U.S. 310 (1945).
342 U.S. 437 (1952).

42

St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882).

43
44
45

RESTATEmENT, CoNrLi'ci or LAWS, § 85 (Supp. 1948).

46

Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
Id., 115 N.E. at 918.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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In the course of rendering its decision, however, the Court ultimatdly
reverted to the "systematic and continuous" 47 standard, thus indicating
that this criterion still prevails.
Unless the dicta of the InternationalShoe case is further extended,
the activities of foreign airlines within the state will have to be more
than casual or sporadic for the state to acquire jurisdiction. While those
airlines which maintain ticket agencies and utilize the other aviation
facilities of the state will no doubt be regarded as "doing business"
witiin that state, the courts may find that the activities of other airlines
are merely occasional and therefore insufficient to meet the "systematic
and continuous" test. Moreover, even if this standard is met and the
corporation is deemed to be "doing business," the state cannot acquire
jurisdiction, under the majority view, unless the cause of action arises
within the state.
Conclusion
It is evident that the states are confronted with a definite problem
which, like that of the motor vehicle, must eventually be resolved by
some form of legislative action. In all probability, those states which
enact statutes providing that the cause of action must arise within the
state, will be able to justify such legislation as a constitutionally valid
exercise of the police power. If, on the other hand, future enactments
attempt to extend jurisdiction to out-of-state causes of action on the
thesis that the airline was "doing business" within the state, a number
of legal as well as practical problems will result. Assuming that the courts
find the activities of the airline within the state sufficient to satisfy the
legal requisites of "doing business," the additional requirement that the
cause of action arise from such business must be met. 48
On the practical side, it should be noted that those states which have
no ceiling as to wrongful death claims will be plagued by lawsuits arising
from out-of-state air disasters merely because the ill-fated plane used an
airfield within the state at an earlier stage of its journey. This factor,
supplemented by the further realization of the great number of planes
that use New York's airports every day, should lead that state to
abandon its statute as well as prompt other states to limit their nonresident aircraft statutes to causes of action arising within the state.
Harry D. Snyder, Jr.
John A. Vuono

47

Id. at 320.
The fact that the airline ticket is purchased within the state might be suffident grounds to give risl to a contract action.
48

